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ABSTRACT 
The application of name suppression law has often been controversial, and this 
controversy was evident in the cases of Victim X, the All Black who assaulted his wife 
and also the "white-collar drug-ring". ew Zealand's approach to suppression law is 
premised on the fundamental importance of the principle of openness, and requires 
"compelling reasons" in order depart from the presumption in favour of publication. Due 
to the significance of the principle of openness under the current approach to suppression 
law, little weight is accorded to the fact that the applicant is a victim, or an accused, rather 
than a convicted person. 
This paper explores the validity of this principle as a justification for the 
presumption in favour of publication. It is argued that the principle of openness is an 
inadequate justification for the current approach to suppression law. It is also argued that 
the failure to distinguish between different types of applicants is not justifiable. Further, it 
is argued that the current approach cannot be justified by recourse to the commonly cited 
principles, nor any other factors. The only adequate justification for denying an applicant 
name suppression is where the decision is made based on public interest. It is important 
however, that where a decision is based on public interest, that public interest is 
distinguished from public prurience. 
This paper advocates that decisions made on name suppression applications are 
made based on public interest and that these decisions take into account the role that the 
applicant plays in the proceedings. [t is in the interests of justice, and importantly in the 
public interest that such an approach is taken. 
Word Length: 
The text of this paper ( excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes, bibliography and 
appendices) comprises approximately 13000 words. 
Name suppression- Public interest- Open Justice 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY or WEL~INGTON 
I INTRODUCTION 
The issue of name suppression has created controversy in recent years, 
and the inconsistent application of suppression law has been the cause of much 
criticism. This paper seeks to explore the causes of the controversy in regards to 
name suppression, with the purpose of determining whether change is required to 
the approach taken to decisions regarding name suppression and to the principles 
guiding those decisions. 
The legal basis for the making of suppression orders is discussed, with 
particular reference to the authoritative court decisions that guide the 
determination of applications for suppression orders. Although suppression 
orders can be made to encompass witnesses, victims, convicted persons, accused 
persons or any other person connected with the criminal proceedings, the 
particular focus of the paper is on offenders, alleged and convicted, and victims 
of offences. The principles guiding decisions regarding name suppression are 
then discussed. 
Once the legal principles behind suppression orders have been explored, 
this paper examines the controversial cases of Victim X and the All Black that 
assaulted his wife. The decision to grant name suppression to the former sporting 
celebrities embroiled in the "white-collar drug-ring" is also discussed as it raises 
interesting issues. The merits of these cases and the issues provoked by them are 
then discussed in order to determine whether the cases were decided correctly 
and whether the principles guiding the decisions were correct. It is argued that 
the All Black case was wrongly decided under current law, but for the right 
reasons, and that the Victim X case was correctly decided but for the wrong 
reasons. Additionally it is argued that the decision to give name suppression to 
the sports stars was justifiable, but the fact that it was not justified, as no reasons 
were given to support the decision makes it a questionable decision. 
As these cases highlight some problems with the operation of suppression 
law, the next section of the paper discusses whether the presumption in favour of 
publication is justifiable. In particular, the notion that justice has to be seen to be 
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done is examined, as although there is merit to the aphorism, and this paper does 
not question the validity of the principle of open justice, it does not necessarily 
provide justification for the presumption against name suppression. In examining 
whether the presumption in favour of publication is justifiable the paper also 
considers whether the courts have made an appropriate distinction between 
public interest and public prurience, as public interest may often be the basis for 
denying name suppression applications. Relating to these issues is a 
consideration of whether there should be a "special echelon for privileged 
people", 1 in terms of more readily allowing applications for name suppression 
that emanate from public figures. 
As the current application of the law regarding suppression orders has been 
exposed as problematic the paper also considers possible options for reform. It is 
the argument of the paper that the principles guiding suppression order decisions 
are misplaced and are in need of reconsideration. Where naming the offender or 
alleged offender does not serve any end of justice, then ostensibly there is no 
justification for the publication of their name, so a suppression order should not 
be opposed. It is unfair and unjustifiable that the same considerations apply to a 
victim applying for a suppression order as to a convicted person. 
In this regard the recommendation of the Law Commission to amend the 
test that applies to victims who apply for name suppression is meritorious and 
would serve to remedy the current injustice. However, this paper alternatively 
advocates for the insertion of a new section 140A into the Criminal Justice Act 
1985 (the Act). The approach mandated by section 140A would ensure that 
decisions regarding name suppression applications are justifiable in the public 
interest, and also ensure that appropriate weight is given to the applicant's role in 
the proceedings. For what is important is that the ends of justice, and importantly 
the public interest, are served. 
1 R v Procktor [ 1997] l NZLR 295, 299-300 (CA) Thomas J quoting the lower Court. 
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II SUPPRESSION ORDERS 
A The Criminal Justice Act 1985 
Section 140 of the Act gives the Court the power to make an order 
suppressing the publication of the name, address or occupation of a person 
accused or convicted of an offence, or of any other person connected with those 
proceedings. 2 It is clear that "any other person connected with those 
proceedings" extends to victims as well as offenders. An order made under 
section 140 may be given temporary or permanent effect,3 and any breach of this 
section is liable on summary conviction to a fine of up to $1000.
4 However, 
when making an order permanently suppressing the name of an offender the 
court must take into account the views of the victim of the offence. 
5 The 
provisions al lowing the court to make an order suppressing the particulars of the 
offender are generally pennissive and offer no guidance as to when such an order 
should be made. However, the principles guiding the making of suppression 
orders can be readily deduced with reference to leading decisions of the court. 
B The Principles of Section 140 
R v Liddell is regarded as the authority in New Zealand of when an order 
suppressing the name of an offender can be made.
6 R v Liddell was not however 
considered to be an appropriate case for the making of a suppression order, and 
Cooke P even found that there were positive public interest reasons pointing to 
disclosure. 7 The positive public interest reasons, which are common to many 
situations, were that publishing the offender's name might lead to more possible 
victims coming forward, and that publishing the offender' s name mitigated the 
risk of future offending by making the identity of the offender known. Other 
potentially relevant public interest factors mentioned in the leading decisions are 
2 Criminal Justice Act I 985, s 140( I). 
3 Criminal Justice Act I 985 , s 140(2). 
4 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 140(5). 
5 Criminal Justice Act I 985, s 140( 4A). 
6 R v Liddell [ 1995] I NZLR 538 (CA). See also R v Procktor [ 1997] 1 NZLR 295 (CA). 
1 R v Liddell (1995] I NZLR 538, 547 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
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that the failure to name the accused can lead susp1c1on to fall on others, 
8 
especially when the profession of the accused has been published, and also that 
publication allows members of the public to form their own decisions about 
people rather than have those decisions made for them by the court.
9 
This may be 
particularly important pre-trial where the accused has dealings with the public, as 
the accused is still entitled to conduct their business as per usual. "[I]f name 
suppression is granted and the appellant is ultimately convicted, clients could 
quite rightly say that they were denied relevant infonnation."
10 
So, in denying an 
application for name suppression the Court is allowing members of the public to 
make their own assessment on whether they choose to use the accused's services. 
Cooke P stated that when considering whether a suppression order should 
be made pursuant to section 140 of the Act: 
11 
[T]he starting point must always be the importance in a democracy of 
freedom of speech, open judicial proceedings, and the right of the 
media to report the latter fairly and accurately as 'surrogates of the 
public '. 
Cooke P noted that although the Court has jurisdiction to make a 
suppression order even in the most serious of cases, such jurisdiction should be 
exercised with the "utmost caution" and would rarely be exercised on the basis of 
the interests of the offender's family. 12 Although Cooke P acknowledged the 
importance of privacy and other interests of the offender's family, he identified 
these interests as common to most situations in which suppression orders are 
sought and noted that they will rarely be enough to displace the weighty 
presumption in favour of openness. 13 This presumption was not displaced in R v 
Liddell, even though, according to a psychiatrist and work associates of the 
accused's wife, '[p]ublication could well, if not destroy her, [the accused's wife] 
knock her down so hard that she wouldn't be able to help herself or her sons any 
8 Police v M (March 5 2002) HC A 9/02. 
9 M v Police (2 April 2004) HC HAM AP 419/ 4019, Venning J. 
10 M v Police (2 April 2004) HC HAM AP 419/ 4019, Venning J. 
11 R v Liddell [ 1995] I NZLR 538, 546 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
12 R v Liddell [1995] 1 NZLR 538, 547 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
13 R v Liddell [ 1995] 1 NZLR 538, 54 7 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
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longer' .14 This illustrates how high the threshold for displacing the presumption 
lS. 
In determining how section 140 of the Act should be applied Cooke P 
considered that it would be inappropriate to set out any kind of "fettering 
code". 15 However, his Honour did emphasise the fact that when a Judge is 
considering whether to grant a suppression order pursuant to section 140 of the 
Act there is a prima facie presumption in favour of openness. 16 
Factors that are to be weighed when considering an application under 
section 140 of the Act include, but are not limited to, whether the accused is 
convicted or acquitted, the seriousness of the offending, the adverse impact 
publication is likely to have on the offender's rehabilitation, the public interest in 
knowing the name of the offender, and circumstances personal to the offender. 17 
If a decision regarding suppression is being detem1ined prior to a verdict being 
given, there is the additional factor of the presumption of innocence that has to 
be considered, although this factor alone is insufficient to displace the 
presumption of publication. 18 However, it must be remembered that section 140 
of the Act allows for a temporary suppression order to be made. 19 
The decision of R v Liddell is important as it highlights the importance of 
the principles of freedom of speech and openness of judicial proceedings, and the 
decision stands as authority for the weighty presumption in favour of reporting. 
Subsequent authorities have mandated that "compelling reasons" or "very special 
circumstances" need to be present in order to justify departure from the principle 
f · · 20 o openJustlce. 
14 R v Liddell [ 1995] I NZLR 538, 544 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
15 R v Liddell [ 1995] I NZLR 538, 547 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
16 R v Liddell [ I 995] 1 NZLR 538, 54 7 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
17 As summarised in Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546, para 42 (CA) Elias CJ for 
the Court. 
18 R v Procktor [1997] I NZLR 295,297 (CA) Thomas J for the Court. 
19 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 140(2). 
20 See for example Re Victim X [2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 18 (HC) Hammond J and Re Victim X 
[2003] 3 NZLR 230, para 36 (CA) Keith J for the Court. 
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R v Liddell is also authority for the proposition that members of the 
offender's family constitute "any other person connected with the proceedings" 
for the purpose of section 140 of the Act, thereby giving the court jurisdiction to 
make an order suppressing the particulars of the offender's family.11 Victims of 
offences can be the subject of section 140 orders; however the names of victims 
of sexual offences are automatically suppressed.
22 The decision in R v Liddell 
also touches on the jurisdictional issue of the appealability of suppression orders. 
Cooke P found that the tem1 "sentence", as contained in section 379 of the 
Crimes Act 1961, includes "any order of the Court made on conviction", hence 
giving the court jurisdiction to hear an appeal against the granting of a 
suppression order when it is an order made on conviction.
23 
When a suppression 
order is made it is a well-established principle that the reasons for the 
suppression order should be explained.
24 
Another point that is made clear by the authorities, although not apparent 
from its application, is that the decision to make a suppression order should not 
be made on the basis of a person's wealth or standing in society, without 
evidence of "special ham1" occurring to the applicant through the publicity that 
would occur if they were to be named. 25 This point is made in R v Procktor, 
where it was stated that, "[ o ]ne must be careful to avoid creating a special 
echelon of privileged persons in the cotnmunity who will enjoy suppression 
where their less fortunate compatriots would not."
26 
The discretional application of section 140 of the Act should seemingly 
then be quite straightforward. There is a strong presumption in favour of 
openness and reporting, and exceptional circumstances are required to displace 
this presumption. Where there is doubt the scales should surely be tipped in 
favour of reporting, and only in rare cases will a pem1anent name suppression 
21 R v Liddell [1995] l NZLR 538, 546 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
22 Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 139. 
23 R v Liddell [1995] I NZLR 538, 544 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. Interesting jurisdictional 
issues have arisen in other cases involving appeals against suppression orders made under 
section 140 of the Act but have not been examined for the purpose of this paper, see generally Re 
Victim X [2003] 3 NZLR 230 (CA) and R v B (21 April 2005) CA 4/05. 
24 Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney General [1982] 1 NZLR 120 (CA) 123. 
25 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546, para 67 (CA) Elias CJ for the Court. 
26 R v Procktor [1997] l NZLR 295, 299-300 (CA) Thomas J quoting the lower Court. 
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order be made. This discretional application has however come under scrutiny in 
the media in recent years. This paper now examines three cases contributing to 
the controversy that section 140 and the application of this section has caused. In 
discussing these cases the approach taken by the ourt in the respective cases is 
questioned, and the policy guiding their decisions is examined. 
Ill RECENT EXAMPLES OF CONTROVERSIAL SUPPRESSION 
CASES 
A The All Black 
In October 2004 a domestic incident occurred, which involved an All 
Black assaulting his wife. The All Black, who pleaded guilty to assaulting his 
wife, was discharged without conviction in the Waitakere Family Violence Court 
after agreeing to undergo counselling.27 The All Black was granted pennanent 
name suppression. The granting of name suppression created quite a furore in 
many circles. Women's refuge and domestic violence groups vented their 
outrage through the media at the decision to grant name suppression, stating that 
perpetrators of domestic violence need to be named. 28 Constitutional law expert 
Professor Bill Hodge stated that the decision gives the impression that different 
law applies to different levels of people in society, and that the granting of name 
suppression takes the truth away from the courtroom. 29 
According to media reports, Judge Recordon acknowledged that well-
known people have no more immunity to publication than any other person does; 
however he found circumstances justifying pennanent name suppression. 30 The 
Judge reportedly held that revealing the All Black' s name would have an 
enormous effect on his family, career and life. Hence permanent name 
27 Amanda Spratt "Assault All Black's Name Revealed on Net" The New Zealand Herald 
Auckland. 
28 "Anger at All Black Suppression" (December l O 2004) <http: //www.tvnz.co.nz> (last accessed 
9 June 2005). 
29 "All Black discharged for Wife Assault" (February 23 2005) <http: //www.tvnz.co.nz> (last 
accessed 9 June 2005). 
30 "Anger at All Black Suppression" (December l O 2004) <http://www.tvnz.co.nz> (last accessed 
9 June 2005). 
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suppression was justified.31 Of these factors it appears that the likely effect on the 
family was a weighty factor relied upon in making the suppression order. Also, 
that the victim in this case was his wife no doubt added weight to the claim that 
the All Black's name should be suppressed. 
The decision to grant name suppression to the All Black does not appear to 
sit well with the decision in R v Liddell, where psychiatric evidence claiming that 
publication would cause the accused's wife to break down was not enough to 
displace the presumption in favour of openness. Nor does it sit well with the 
decision in Re Victim X,32 where the victim's wishes regarding name suppression 
were seemingly overruled by "public interest". 
The only "very special circumstances" present in this case appear to be the 
fact that the accused is an All Black. This in itself cannot justify a suppression 
order though, as this is tantamount to "creating a special echelon of privileged 
persons in the community who will enjoy suppression".33 It is interesting to note 
that this occasion was only the second time in that Court's (the Waitakere Family 
Violence Court) history that a permanent name suppression order was made. The 
other suppression order made was for another New Zealand rugby player.
34 This 
creates the appearance of a "special echelon", despite the authority expressly 
forbidding such an approach. 
There is an obvious difference between this case and that of R v Liddell 
though. The All Black's assault on his wife did not constitute a serious assault 
(although this point is debatable in a society where domestic violence in itself is 
very serious), whereas the accused in R v Liddell was a proven paedophile 
convicted of indecent assault and sodomy. The argument following on from that 
point is that as the All Black's offence is not very serious the detrimental effects 
flowing from the publication of his name would be disproportionate to the 
offence. This reasoning does make sense, and ostensibly forms the basis of Judge 
31 "All Black Discharged for Wife Assault" (February 23 2005) <http: //www.tvnz.co.nz> (last 
accessed 9 June 2005). 
32 Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220, discussed below. 
33 R v Procktor [1997] l NZLR 295, 299-300 (CA) Thomas J quoting the lower court. 
34 "Anger at All Black Suppression" (December I O 2004) <http://www.tvnz.co.nz> (last accessed 
9 June 2005). 
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Recordon's decision; however it is not necessarily the only, nor the best 
approach. There is a valid argument that, if the offence is not serious enough to 
warrant censure from the legal system, because he was discharged without 
conviction, how can it be considered serious enough to justify the protection of 
his reputation through name suppression?35 Whilst the lack of seriousness may 
have been a persuasive factor for Judge Recordon in granting the suppression 
order, it does not necessarily constitute the best justification for the order. 
There are no positive public interest reasons favouring disclosure of the All 
Black's name as there were in R v Liddell, except perhaps that failure to name the 
All Black could lead to suspicion falling on others. 36 That aside, there is no 
pertinent reason to require the All Black's name to be published, and as such the 
suppression order appears correct and fair. However it does not sit well with the 
fundamental principles of openness, freedom of speech and the weighty 
presumption in favour of reporting. 
Remembering that the starting point 1s a presumption m favour of 
reporting, and that exceptional circumstances are required to displace this 
presumption, the decision to grant the All Black permanent name suppression, 
whilst perhaps correct in terms of fairness, is irreconcilable with authority on 
section 140 of the Act. The effect on the family could hardly be characterised as 
exceptional, as anguish to the family of an offender is relatively commonplace. 
As the victim in this case was part of the offender's family, it is arguable that 
Judge Recordon's decision was correct in law. However the authoritative case of 
Re Victim X strongly suggests that Judge Recordon erred in his approach,37 as in 
Re Victim X it was stated that the private interests of victims would not generally 
outweigh the principle of open justice,38 and as such are generally insufficient to 
warrant the granting of a suppression order. With this dictum in mind, the 
35 Richard Davis "Name Suppression: More Hann Than Good?" <http ://www.casi.org.nz> (last 
accessed 31 May 2005). Davis was criticising the District Court Judge that granted name 
suppression to Peter Lewis, a billionaire who pleaded guilty to charges of importation of Class 8 
and Class C drugs. 
36 This was the justification for rescinding a suppression order in Police v M (March 5 2002) HC 
9/02. 
37 Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220 (HC) Hammond J. 
38 Re Victim X [2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 48 (HC) Hammond J. 
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decision to grant the All Black permanent name suppression is not supported by 
authority. 
When looking at the decision in light of the authorities on section 140 of 
the Act, it is possible, or perhaps even probable, that Judge Recordon made the 
wrong decision. But is there really anything wrong with the decision? The case 
arguably diminishes the importance of the principle of openness - justice cannot 
be seen to be done if the public do not know who the offender is. But as there is 
no legitimate public interest justification (unless nosiness is a legitimate public 
interest factor) for publishing his name, this limitation, if it is a limitation, on the 
principle should be considered acceptable. Arguably nosiness does constitute a 
relevant factor though, if the dictum of Hammond J is applied: "the public is 
entitled to know and form their own views on what happened".39 The decision in 
the All Black case highlights the need to reconsider the guiding principles 
relating to suppression orders, as present inconsistencies and questionable 
decisions may lead to the justice system being criticised. 
The All Black case is a rare example of a successful application for 
permanent name suppression, which has predictably been subject to considerable 
criticism. This paper now considers another interesting issue in the context of 
name suppression, which arises where it is the victim who seeks to have their 
identity suppressed. 
B VictimX 
In July 2002 the police uncovered an elaborate plan of three men to 
kidnap and hold for ransom a wealthy Wellington businessman. Initially the 
name of the intended victim was suppressed, but the suppression order was later 
overturned as it was held that the private interest of the intended victim did not 
outweigh the principles of openness and freedom of speech. Interest in knowing 
the identity was high, and the Court eventually lifted its initial suppression order 
and identified the intended victim as William Trotter. This case raises issues 
39 Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 38 (HC) Hammond J. 
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distinct from that of the All Black and the accused in R v Liddell, as the victim 
was in no way at fault and understandably wanted to keep his identity secret. The 
High Court and Court of Appeal found that the private interests of victims would 
not usually outweigh the principle of open justice.40 
Circumstances, both in terms of Trotter's life and in terms of the trial 
against those accused of conspiring to kidnap, had changed between the granting 
of name suppression and the decision to lift the suppression order. At the time of 
the initial order, Mr X's wife was five months pregnant, and the possible effect 
on the pregnancy of the stress of publication was a major justification for the 
suppression order. The safe delivery of the child removed this justification. The 
fact that it was unlikely that Mr X would testify at the trial of the alleged 
conspiring kidnappers and that it is mandatory to take the victim's views into 
account were other factors supporting the suppression of Mr X's name. 41 
Apart from the impact that public identification would have on the daily 
life of Mr X and his family, there was no other reason that supported the 
continuation of the suppression order. 42 Whilst Hammond J repeatedly 
acknowledged that Mr X and his family were in no way at fault, he concluded 
that their private interests were insufficient to displace the weighty presumption 
in favour of openness. A decision as to whether a suppression order should be 
made for a victim as opposed to an offender requires the same considerations and 
the application of the same principles.43 Hammond J noted that Parliament had 
recently legislated to give victims of offences more consideration and they "drew 
the line where they did." 44 Hammond J therefore considered that it was 
inappropriate to give different considerations to victims of offences as it was 
open for the legislature to dictate that approach, but they did not, hence it was 
inappropriate for the court to go further than Parliament had. Whilst Hammond 
40 Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 48 (HC) Hammond J and Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 
230, para 36 (CA) Keith J for the Court. 
41 Re Victim X [2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 4 (HC) Hammond J. 
42 Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 44 (HC) Hammond J. 
43 Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 34 (HC) Hammond J. 
44 Re Victim X [2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 42 (HC) Hammond J in reference to the Victims' Rights 
Act 2002. 
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J's decision is correct in law it appears to be wrong in principle, as it is arguably 
not right that victims and offenders are subject to the same considerations. 
The importance of the principle of openness was reaffirmed in the case of 
Mr X, but the case begs the question - should the private interests of victims be 
treated differently from the privacy interests of offenders? 
The importance of the principle of openness is often justified on the basis 
that justice must be seen to be done, and also to ensure that justice is done. Grant 
Slevin has stated that the paramount purpose of publicity is to ensure that justice 
is done.45 This is perhaps true when it comes to the naming and public trial of 
offenders, but this same justification is not applicable to innocent victims. 
However, it was the very justification relied upon by Hammond J, in 
emphasising the rarity of kidnappings in New Zealand and the accompanying 
public curiosity.46 His Honour stated that "the public is entitled to know and form 
its own views on what happened", and that this can only properly be done in a 
public forum. 47 Hammond J, despite acknowledging that there exists a degree of 
prurience on the part of some people, nevertheless decided to fuel that prurience 
by discontinuing the suppression order.48 Hammond J ostensibly failed to make 
an important distinction. His Honour equated the fact that the public is interested 
with the concept of public interest, which surely are entirely different concepts. 
This argument is developed in more detail when the paper considers whether the 
presumption against suppression is justifiable. 
Whilst the decision to deny Mr X name suppression is undoubtedly in 
accordance with the principles set down to guide decisions on suppression orders, 
it is not fair that an innocent victim is subject to the same considerations as 
offenders. That justice must be seen to be done is not appropriate as a 
justification for the naming of victims who wish to keep their identity hidden. 
Nor is the "right" of the public to know in order to fonn their own views, as 
surely people could form their own views without knowing the victim's name. 
45 Grant Slevin "Name Suppression" [2004] NZLJ 223, 223. 
46 Re Victim X [2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 38 (I-IC) Hammond J. 
47 Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 38 (HC) Hammond J. 
48 Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 38 (HC) Hammond J. 
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The private interests of victims surely warrant more recognition than just being 
an important factor when it comes to determining an application for suppression. 
Perhaps a different test entirely would be appropriate. This is discussed further 
when the paper considers options for reforming suppression law. 
The present situation, where victims and offenders are subject to the same 
considerations when an application for a name suppression order is being 
determined should be reconsidered as it is not fair to victims and it appears that 
the same justifications cannot be applied. This paper now discusses another well-
publicised suppression order before considering the justifications for publication 
and possibilities for reform. 
C Sports Stars Drug Case 
On July 19 2005 a "white-collar drug-ring" was uncovered and the names 
of 10 people allegedly associated with this ring were suppressed.49 Two of the 
names suppressed are those of two former TV sports stars. so Interesting issues 
arise from the decision to grant name suppression in this case. On the face of it, 
the decision to grant name suppression to the sports stars is justifiable, (at least 
until they were charged), but the circumstances surrounding the suppression 
make the order questionable. 
Name suppression was granted in this case without the Judge hearing any 
arguments as to why the names should be suppressed. Further, Judge Everitt 
initially made the suppression order, no reasons were published in support of his 
suppression order. The order could presumably be easily justified but, because it 
was, the respectability of the order is questionable. Although there is no strict 
rule stating that reasons must be given, it is important that reasons are given. 51 It 
is important to recognise that reasons cannot be given in every instance where a 
suppression order is made though, as in some cases the reasons supporting a 
49 David McLoughlin "Celebrities snared in a tangled web" (July 30 2005) The Dominion Post 
Wellington Al4. 
50 David McLoughlin "Celebrities snared in a tangled web" (July 30 2005) The Dominion Post 
Wellington Al4. 
51 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546, para 79 (CA) Elias CJ for the court. 
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suppression order may necessarily identify the person covered by a the 
suppression order. This reasoning is clearly not applicable here as the professions 
were publishable, meaning that there was no great veil of secrecy. The giving of 
reasons makes it possible to understand why the judicial authority has been 
exercised in that way, and it also provides a mechanism for assessing the 
lawfulness of the decision. 52 As Judge Everitt did not give reasons to justify 
name suppression order we caimot be sure why he exercised his authority in the 
manner he did. 
Another interesting aspect of the suppression order in this case is that the 
order did not prohibit the professions of the persons from being published. Two 
of those cmmected with the "white-collar drug-ring" were said to be television 
sporting celebrities.53 Given the size of New Zealand and the limited number of 
television sporting celebrities in New Zealand there is only a limited amount of 
people to whom the suppression order could refer.
54 This undoubtedly has led 
suspicion to fall on others, which has previously been identified as a public 
interest factor in favour of pub I ication. 
Another issue arises when one considers the above factors in tandem. As 
no reasons were given for the suppression order but we are told that two of the 
persons involved in the ' drug-ring ' are sporting celebrities, the inference that 
there is a "special echelon for privileged people" resonates. The lack of reasons 
invites the conclusion that the suppression order was based on their status as 
celebrities, which is undoubtedly inconsistent with the authority on section 140 
of the Act. The original suppression order covered all ten persons alleged to be 
involved with the 'drug-ring ' , which could suggest that the argument that there is 
a "special echelon for privileged people" is fallacious. But nearly all of the other 
people involved were successful members of society, although "[n]one is a 
household name."55 As those who are successful members of society are likely to 
receive more media attention than their less successful peers, then perhaps a 
52 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd [2000] 3 NZLR 546, para 80 (CA) Elias CJ for the court. 
53 David McLaughlin "Celebrities snared in a tangled web" (July 30 2005) The Dominion Post 
Wellington Al 4. 
54 Steven Price "Interesting Name Suppressions" (2005) NZMLJ@yahoogroups.com. 
55 David McLoughlin "Celebrities snared in a tangled web" (July 30 2005) The Dominion Post 
Wellington A 14. 
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"special echelon for privileged people" should be created. Although this option 
appears undesirable as it allows the court to treat people unequally on the basis of 
their standing in society, it could be justified on the basis that it is recognition 
that publicity is applied unequally. 56 This point is addressed further when 
considering the justification of the present presumptions in suppression law. 
So, although the suppression orders could have been justified, the above-
mentioned factors make the order somewhat questionable. Adding to the 
questionability of the suppression orders is the unsurprising amount of media 
attention that was attracted by the allegations. Because the media were allowed 
to publicise the professions of those involved it was only natural that this would 
be a highly publicised incident. One might argue that, if the names of those 
involved in the event accompanied the heightened publicity, the adverse effect on 
the individuals would be too severe. This argument would be partly in reliance 
on the effect of publicity on the presumption of innocence. The heightened 
publicity surrounding the event and the police being lauded for uncovering this 
"white-collar drug-ring" seem to contradict the notion of innocence. 
Accompanying that concern is the fact that acquittals tend not to be extensively 
publicised,57 meaning that if those publicly named are later absolved of blame or 
liability this important fact may not be publicly recognised. Also, even if there is 
publicity accompanying the clearance "some people may think that the person 
was guilty, but somehow managed to get off on a 'technicality', as there is 'no 
smoke without fire'. "58 It is in this regard that the suppression order could be said 
to be justified. However, even though the above-mentioned argument 1s 
meritorious, it is not novel and the presumption of innocence in itself 1s 
insufficient to justify a suppression order.59 
There are several courses of action that Judge Everitt could have taken that 
would have been preferable. In granting a suppression order (which was open to 
56 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice" (200 I) 21 VU WLR I 77, 204. 
57 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice" (200 I) 21 VU WLR 177, 203. 
58 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice" (200 I) 21 VUWLR 177, 203. 
59 R v Procktor [ 1997] 1 NZLR 295, 297 (CA) Thomas J for the Court. 
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do) Judge Everitt could have given reasons to support his order. This would have 
silenced the criticism that there is a "special echelon for privileged people". Or 
perhaps the Judge could have extended his suppression order to prohibit 
publication of the professions of those involved, although this may have been 
difficult to justify in principle. In fact, this may have actually heightened the 
already intense publicity, as the police had sent out an email to 65 media outlets 
with the headline "White-collar drugs ring busted" capitalised in bold print. 
60 
The media interest would still be intense regardless, and the inability to publish 
the professions may have in fact heightened the controversy. Another option 
open to Judge Everitt was to not allow the suppression order. The media interest 
would have been no greater than it was when only the professions were known, 
there could be no inference of a "special echelon" and this would have removed 
the ability to speculate and have suspicion fall on other people who fit the profile 
of television sports star. 
It may be making a storm in a teacup to highlight this suppression order as 
controversial, but Judge Everitt left himself open to criticism by not giving 
reasons in support of his order. This was exacerbated by the intense media 
coverage, which gave the impression that there is a "special echelon for 
privileged people" when name suppression is in issue. So, although the order 
may have been justifiable the fact that no justification was given makes the order 
questionable and open to criticism. This highlights the need for openness, in 
terms of openly justifying judicial decision-making, even if the openness only 
goes as far as providing justification for not being open. 
The paper now considers, in light of the criticisms and problems that have 
been identified with suppression orders, whether the presumption against 
suppression orders is justifiable. 
60 David McLaughlin "Celebrities snared in a tangled web" (July 30 2005) The Dominion Post 
Wellington Al 4. 
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IV IS THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST SUPPRESSION JUSTIFIABLE? 
"What has to be stressed is that the pnma facie presumption as to 
reporting is always in favour of openness."61 This dictum, from the leading case 
on the making of suppression orders, establishes a presumption in favour of 
reporting except where there are exceptional circumstances to displace the 
presumption. But, what is the justification for this presumption? The weighty 
presumption in favour of reporting has gained almost unquestioned acceptance, 
and the fundamental importance of openness has resonated throughout the cases 
determining suppression issues. The importance of open judicial proceedings is 
not questioned by this paper, as openness is recognised as an important 
characteristic of a democracy. 62 Openness is especially important in criminal 
cases, more so than in civil cases, because crimes are said to be committed 
against the community. Open judicial proceedings ensure public accountability, 
by providing a check on the judicial process. 63 This can be contrasted to the 
Family Court, where the issues are essentially private, and there is additional 
concern for the interests of the children that are often involved. Even with 
increasing openness in the Family Court though, the names often tend to be 
suppressed, tending to suggest that the principle of open justice is not being used 
d · · 64 to estroy pnvate interests. 
Openness is also regarded as important when allowing suppression orders 
as giving reasons ensures the integrity of the judicial system. So, whilst this 
paper does not question the importance of open judicial proceedings, it does 
however question whether it is necessary in the pursuance of some end of justice 
that there is a presumption in favour of reporting where name suppression is 
sought. In particular it questions whether publication of names is a necessary 
corollary of the important principle of openness. The publicity associated with 
criminal proceedings is recognised as an integral part of criminal procedure, 
61 R v Liddell [1995) l NZLR 538, 547 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
62 Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 51 (HC) Hammond J. 
63 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice"(2001)2l VUWLR 177,185. 
64 Rt Hon Dame Sian Elias CJ GNZM, "Address to the Australasian Family Courts Conference in 
Auckland on 15 October 1999" (2000) 3 BFLJ l 07. 
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and - arguably, strangely - is rarely called into question. 65 One of the 
justifications for publicity and the publication of names is said to be that justice 
has to be seen to be done, and that openness in tum ensures that justice is 
actually done.66 The next part of the paper questions whether this aphorism is an 
appropriate justification for the presumption against name suppression. 
A The Principle of Openness: Justice Has to be Seen to be Done 
Openness of judicial proceedings is said to ensure that justice is done. 
Grant Slevin has stated that the "paramount purpose" of publicity is to ensure 
that justice is done. It is the argument of this paper that these ideas serve as apt 
justifications for openness of judicial proceedings, which New Zealand has 
except for in very limited circumstances, but are perhaps insufficient as 
justifications for the presumption against name suppression. Even in the limited 
situations where the Court is closed to the public, the media have the general 
right to remain in the Court.67 The next section explores whether the idea, that 
justice has to be seen to ensure that it is done can be extended to the naming of 
offenders, victims or other persons connected with the criminal proceedings. 
In order to determine whether this can constitute a valid justification for 
the presumption in favour of publication, it is important to determine what 
purpose is served by the publication of names. If publicity, as a result of 
publishing names, can be said to serve an end of justice then perhaps the 
presumption in favour of reporting is more easily justified. "The general rule of 
publicity is after all only the means to an end and must yield to the paramount 
object of doing justice."68 The logical inference that follows on from that is that 
something which serves no end of justice should not be done. Hence, where 
publication of the name of an offender, victim, witness or any person connected 
with the proceedings does not serve any end of justice then it should not be done. 
65 
Roderick Munday "Name Suppression: An Adjunct to the Presumption of Innocence and to the 
Mitigation of Sentence" [1991] Crim LR 680, 755. 
66 Grant Slevin "Name Suppression" [2004] NZLJ 223, 223. 
67 Grant Slevin "Name Suppression" [2004] NZLJ 223, 223. 
68 Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney-General [ 1982] 1 NZLR 120, 131 (CA) 
Woodhouse P for the Court. 
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Publication must serve some public interest function or be in pursuance of some 
end of justice to be justifiable. Hence the starting point in suppression law, from 
a presumption in favour of publication, prima facie does not appear to be 
consistent with the notion that the paramount object is of doing justice, unless of 
course publication of names is necessary to ensure that justice is done. The paper 
now considers what purpose is apparently served by the publication of names, 
and further whether publication of names in necessary to ensure that justice is 
done. 
New Zealand courts have recognised that publicity serves a punitive 
function.69 In this regard, the naming of offenders post-conviction could perhaps 
be justified on the premise that publication of their name is part of their 
punishment for being convicted of a crime. This would however not provide 
adequate justification for the publication of names of victims, witnesses or other 
persons connected with the proceedings, and perhaps not even a majority of 
offenders, as often conviction is punishment enough. It must also be remembered 
that publicity is not something that the court orders, but rather it is the media that 
are the proponents of publicity and the punitive aspect of this is further enforced 
by the public. 70 
Publicity is also said to have a deterrent effect on people. 71 In publishing a 
person's name that person, and/ or other potential offenders, may be deterred. 
This rationale could again only logically apply to persons convicted of offences, 
as it would not make sense, nor would it be fair to claim to deter victims or 
acquitted persons. In this regard then, the deterrence value of publishing a name 
is limited. Further, it is unclear whether the theory of deterrence is actually 
justifiable, in the sense of whether people are actually deterred, which again 
suggests that the value of publicity as a deterrent is minimal. 
69 Police v O 'Connor [ 1992) 1 NZLR 87, and also recently T v Police (22 April 2005) HC DUN 
412/ 12 Chisholm J. 
70 Grant Slevin "Name Suppression" [2004) NZLJ 223, 224. 
71 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice"(2001)21 VUWLR 177,187. 
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Publicly naming a person involved in criminal proceedings may also have 
the effect of bringing more potential victims forward, so in this sense the 
accuracy of the proceedings could be increased by the publicity.
72 This would be 
beneficial, and would constitute a valid public interest factor in favour of 
reporting. However, this reasoning may only be applicable in limited 
circumstances, and further it may only provide justification for the naming of an 
accused person rather than any other person connected with the proceedings. 
As alluded to earlier, publicity can also serve the function of ensuring that 
the judicial process is publicly accountable. But this accountability does not 
require all persons connected with criminal proceedings to be publicly named. 
The Court will be open, to the media at the very least, so this ensures some 
degree of accountability. Also, it is often the case that knowing a person's name 
will not add anything material to a person's knowledge about a case. In this sense 
then, publication of a person's name would only serve to feed the public 
prurience, rather than ensuring that justice is done by justice being seen to be 
done. Hence, the publication of names is not a necessary corollary of openness. 
The aphorism that justice has to be seen to be done is generally inappropriate and 
therefore insufficient as a justification for the presumption against name 
suppression. Moreover, where it is appropriate, it will generally only be 
applicable to an accused or convicted person. So, not only is this aphorism 
insufficient as a justification for the presumption, it seems to suggest that the 
current approach of treating offenders in the same way as victims or acquitted 
person is not justified. 
R v W, 73 a recent decision of the Nelson High Court, is an excellent 
illustration of the notion that justice can be open, yet the defendant's name can 
be suppressed. In this case, the accused stood trial for the murder of his five 
month old baby who, as he was informed earlier on the day of the alleged murder, 
was suffering from a condition where her brain had ceased to develop at thirteen 
weeks gestation. The accused's daughter's condition was described as "the worst 
72 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice" (2001) 21 YUWLR 177, 186. 
13 R v W(2 December 2004) HC NEL 042/ 1663, R v W(8 November 2004) HC NEL 042/ 1663. 
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possible survivable brain dysfunction". 74 Mr W suffocated his daughter later that 
day. Expectedly there was a considerable amount of interest in this tragic story. 
Goddard J noted that at all stages of the trial the media were well represented and 
that trial was prominently and regularly covered in the media. 75 Goddard J also 
noted that the level of debate that followed Mr W's acquittal was evidence that 
the public was well infonned about the trial. As a justification for the ordering of 
final name suppression Goddard J remarked that "[i]t can fairly be said that the 
preponderance of public interest favours the privacy interests of Mr W and his 
family rather than the public interest in knowing his identity." 76 This dictum 
does not sit well with the decision in Re Victim X where Hammond J stated that 
"the public is entitled to know and form their own views on what happened",77 as 
a justification for denying the continuance of name suppression. However, there 
is good reason to argue that Goddard J has taken the preferable approach. 
Goddard J recognised that the important principle of open justice dictates 
that publication of information regarding a case should not be restricted, save in 
exceptional circumstances. 78 She also acknowledged that in some situations 
knowing "the identity of a person can add a material dimension to information 
about the crime in question". 79 This is an acceptance that the interest of the 
public will be served by the addition of the name or names of those involved in 
the proceedings. This point is further developed in the following section when 
considering whether there is a difference between the public interest and the fact 
that the public is interested. What is important to emphasise though, is that in this 
case Goddard J saw no reason justifying the publication of Mr W's name, and 
Goddard J granted permanent name suppression. Goddard J concluded that this 
was not a case where knowing the identity of the accused's name would "add 
substantively to information about the crime in question."80 The aphorism that 
justice must be seen to be done could not justify denying Mr W name 
suppression as the Court was open, the media were well-represented throughout 
74 R v W (8 November 2004) HC NEL 042/ 1663 para 2 Goddard J. 
75 R v W(2 December 2004) HC NEL 042/ [663 para 6 Goddard J. 
76 R v W (2 December 2004) HC NEL 042/1663 para 4 Goddard J. 
77 Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 38 (HC) Hammond J. 
78 R v W (2 December 2004) HC NEL 042/1663 para 3 Goddard J. 
79 R v W(2 December 2004) HC NEL 042/ 1663 para 3 Goddard J. 
80 R v W (2 December 2004) HC NEL 042/ 1663 para 3 Goddard J. 
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the trial, and the trial was extensively covered without the publication of Mr W's 
name. That justice must be seen to be done does not necessitate that names are 
published, as knowing a person's name often will not add anything to a person's 
knowledge of the case. 
Goddard J did not seem to start from a presumption in favour of reporting, 
searching for "compelling reasons" to justify the suppression order, but rather 
looked for and found no reasons to publish Mr W's name. Hence her Honour 
granted the pennanent suppression order. This approach does not accord with the 
authority on making suppression orders, but it is meritorious. Where there are no 
reasons to justify the publication of a person's name then it should not be 
published. The approach taken by Goddard J to the question of whether name 
suppression should be pennanently granted suggests that Hammond J was 
incorrect to deny name suppression in Re Victim X, and further casts doubt on the 
justifiability of the presumption against name suppression on the basis that 
justice must be seen to be done. That justice must be seen to be done is not an 
adequate justification for the publication of names, as had already been 
evidenced by the case of R v W. This paper now considers whether the 
presumption against name suppression can be justified on any other grounds. 
B 'Public Interest' v 'The Public Are Interested' 
In Re Victim X Hammond J held that "the public is entitled to know and 
form their own views on what happened",81 and this was his primary justification 
for hol~ing that Victim X was not entitled to permanent name suppression. 
Hammond J has seemingly identified the public interest as equivalent to saying 
that the public were interested. There is no doubt that the public were interested 
in the Victim X case, but was there any public interest in knowing the identity of 
the proposed kidnap victim? At first blush it would appear that knowing the 
identity of the proposed victim would not add anything material to the case and it 
would only serve to feed public prurience. The paper now considers some 
81 Re Victim X[2003] 3 NZLR 220, para 38 (HC) Hammond J. 
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important public interest factors in the context of name suppress10n, and also 
explores the concept of public interest as opposed to public curiosity. 
An important public interest factor that needs to be considered in the 
context of name suppression is freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is 
a right guaranteed under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (the Bill of 
Rights Act), and as such is a right that can only be limited if it can be 
demonstrably justified. 82 Hence, if the media's right to publish the names of 
persons involved in criminal proceedings is to be limited, this limitation must be 
justified. The right to freedom of expression is not an unfettered right to "destroy 
privacy interests", and as such a possible justification for limiting this right may 
be found in New Zealand's increasing recognition of privacy rights. The Privacy 
Act 1993, an Act to promote and protect privacy interests, demonstrates the 
importance of individual privacy, as does the judicial recognition of the tort of 
privacy. In establishing whether a tort of privacy exists in New Zealand, the 
Court of Appeal in Hosking v Runting had to consider whether having a tort of 
privacy would be consistent with the freedom of expression. 83 The Court of 
Appeal decided that the existence of the tort of privacy was consistent with the 
right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights Act. Hence, 
the Court found that while there is public interest in the right to freedom of 
expression, freedom of expression "must accommodate other values which 
society regards as important."84 Privacy is such a value, and as such freedom of 
expression must accommodate this. In this regard then, a limitation on the right 
to freedom of expression is justified where the limitation is made for the purpose 
of privacy. Also, the granting of name suppression to a person is not a great 
encroachment on the right to freedom of expression. The media will still have the 
right to impart information about the details of the case; the only restriction is 
that the name of the person cannot be published. This is not an overwhelming 
restriction as often the name of the person will not add a material dimension to 
the story. So, generally the right to freedom of expression by itself is an 
82 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 5. 
83 Hosking v Runting [2005] l NZLR l (CA). See Andrew Geddis "Hosking v Runting: A 
Privacy Tort for New Zealand" (2005) 13 Tort L Rev 5, 8. 
84 Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR 1, 56 (CA) Tipping J. 
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insufficient public interest factor to support denying an application for name 
suppression. 
When considering whether to grant a suppression order there are several 
other public interest factors that need to be taken into account. The most 
important of those is that the offender may have the opportunity to re-offend if 
their name is suppressed. Others are that identifying the accused may lead to 
other victims coming forward and on similar lines may lead to the discovery of 
more evidence. The granting of name suppression can lead to suspicion falling 
on others, and denies the public the ability to draw their own conclusions about 
associating with the offender. These are undoubtedly valid factors to be 
considered as part of the public interest, but none of these factors are directly 
applicable to the Victim X situation. Further, these public interest factors are 
generally inapplicable to anyone other than an accused or convicted person. 
Hence, on the commonly identified public interest factors there is no reason to 
suggest that publication of Mr X's name was necessary. 
However, under the approach dictated by the Court of Appeal it is 
irrelevant that there is no reason to justify publication, as what matters is the 
fundamental importance of the principle of openness, that can only be displaced 
by "compelling reasons". It does not necessarily matter that they are no reasons 
justifying publication. The questionability of this approach is further addressed 
when considering whether a different "test" should be developed. At this point 
what is important is whether the Court should make a distinction between the 
public interest and the public being interested. 
If public interest is used as a justification for denying a suppression order it 
1s important to consider whether the correct notion of public interest is being 
applied. This paper does not deny that in some cases, particularly those involving 
serious offences, there is a genuine public interest in knowing the identity of the 
offender, especially where there may be public safety concerns. It is not however 
clear why public prurience, in the guise of 'public interest', should take 
precedence over private interests. The difference between public interest and 
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public curiosity has been made clear in the tort of privacy context,
85 but, from the 
cases discussed in this paper, it appears that with regards to name suppression the 
concepts are ostensibly the same. It appears that in the cases discussed in this 
paper that the public interest and public curiosity are the same concepts.
86 For 
example, in R v Liddell, the authoritative decision on suppression law, it was 
apparent that the public interest and the public having an interest were the same 
concepts. When discussing name suppression applications from acquitted 
persons, Cooke P stated that "the public may have an interest in acquittals", as a 
reason suggesting publication may in some cases be necessary.
87 
This paper argues that when considering an application for name 
suppression the Courts should draw a distinction between public interest and 
public curiosity. Public curiosity is an insufficient justification to support 
denying a suppression order, because the fact that the public are interested is not 
a valid public interest factor and further it is an insufficient reason to justify 
subverting a person's privacy interests. Absent any genuine public interest 
factors, this paper argues that an application for name suppression should 
generally be granted. As most public interest factors will be generally 
inapplicable to victims it is therefore argued that their applications for name 
suppression should generally be granted. 
The approach of Hammond Jin Re Victim X, whilst unfair and seemingly 
unjustifiable on a public interest basis, was the correct approach as dictated by 
the current legal position. There were no compelling reasons why Mr X's 
identity should have remained suppressed; hence name suppression could not be 
justified on the authorities. There should however be no need to show 
"compelling reasons" in order to depart from the presumption in favour of 
publication where the presumption cannot be justified on the basis of public 
interest, especially where the applicant is a victim. Where there are no reasons 
justifying the publication of a name then an application for a suppression order 
85 See for example TV3 Network Services Ltd v Broadcasting Standards Authority [ 1995] 2 
NZLR 720 (CA) and Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I (CA). 
86 See for example Re Victim X [2003] 3 NZLR 220, 226 (HC) Hammond J, R v W (2 December 
2004) HC NEL 042/ 1663 and R v Liddell [1995] I NZLR 538,547 (CA) Cooke P. 
87 R v Liddell [1995] I NZLR 538,547 Cooke P. 
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should not be denied. The possibilities for amending the criteria for suppression 
orders are further developed when the reform of suppression law is considered. 
C Should There Be a "Special Echelon for Privileged People"? 
Following on from the issues that arose in the so-called "white-collar 
drug-ring" case the question arises as to whether, in the context of name 
suppression, there should be a "special echelon for privileged people". Arguably, 
this "special echelon" already exists, in the sense that some decisions appear to 
be made on the basis of a person's public status. There was concern following 
the decision to grant the All Black permanent name suppression that the decision 
was made on the basis of his public status rather than anything else. This concern 
was exacerbated by the fact that the only time that that Court (the Waitakere 
Family Violence Court) had granted pem1anent name suppression previously was 
for another New Zealand rugby player. These decisions have the appearance of 
being based on something strictly forbidden by the authorities on name 
suppression. 
At first blush, granting a person name suppression on the basis of their 
public status seems to directly contradict the principle that all people are equal 
before the law, but at the same time that contradiction seems justifiable in 
recognition of the fact that there will be unequal publicity depending on a 
person's status in society. 
88 The courts have recognised that publicity, in the 
context of a criminal trial , serves a punitive function, so it is likely that the 
punitive effect will be greater the more publicity a person receives. Even though 
the punitive aspect of publicity is imposed by the media and the public rather 
than the Court, the Court to some extent has the ability to curtail this punitive 
aspect by granting name suppression. The paper now considers whether it is 
justifiable for the Court to consider a person's standing in society, and the likely 
publicity that they will receive, as part of the name suppression decision. 
88 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done- The Public Administration Of 
Justice" (2001) 21 VUWLR l 77,204. 
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There has been an increasing tendency in New Zealand and in other 
jurisdictions to recognise privacy interests. This is evidenced in New Zealand by 
the passage of the Privacy Act 1993, the Broadcasting Act 1989, the Harassment 
Act 1997 and also the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in the Hosking case, 
which confirmed that there is a tort of privacy in New Zealand.
89 In the United 
Kingdom, and to a lesser extent in Australia, recent cases of 'breach of 
confidence' indicate a more privacy-oriented approach. 
90 This increasing 
tendency to value the privacy interests of those with high public status may 
justify an approach to suppression law that accounts for societal status. Hence, it 
is now considered whether the new lines of legislation and the recently 
confirmed tort of privacy can be used to justify differential treatment. 
There are two principal elements to the tort of privacy in New Zealand. 
First, there needs to be the existence of facts in respect of which there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy; and secondly the publicity given to those 
private facts must be highly offensive to an objective reasonable person.
91 Whilst 
criminal proceedings would not generally be considered to be private facts, an 
analogy can be drawn between the application of this tort and the application of 
name suppression law, as the tort recognises the privacy interests of public 
figures, and the name suppression inquiry is essentially determining whether a 
person can maintain their privacy. Where the tort of privacy, or in other 
jurisdictions, breach of confidence, is invoked it is generally in situations 
involving famous persons, such as Mike Hosking in New Zealand,
92 Michael 
Douglas and Catherine Zeta-Jones, 
93 and Naomi Campbell in the United 
Kingdom,94 and the claims generally centre on publicity about their private lives. 
Whilst the above-mentioned cases were not successful, the fact that their claims 
resulted in court proceedings and the judicial recognition of this particular branch 
of law shows that public figures are entitled to a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, as "[t]he right to privacy is not automatically lost when a person is a 
89 Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I (CA). 
90 See for example Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 1) [200 I] QB 967, Campbell v Mirror Group 
Newspapers [2003] QB 633. 
91 Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I, para 117 (CA) Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
92 Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I (CA). 
93 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 1) [2001] QB 967. 
94 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers [2003] QB 633. 
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public figure". 95 This recognition of the privacy interests of those with celebrity 
status may possibly also extend to the "celebrities" who apply for name 
suppression. 
However, the tort of pnvacy m New Zealand concedes that the 
expectation of privacy of a person diminishes as their public status increases.96 
So, the more famous a person is the less privacy they can reasonably expect. If 
our increasing recognition of privacy interests is used as a justification for 
differential treatment, then this would imply that celebrities involved in criminal 
proceedings have a lesser expectation of privacy because of their celebrity status 
and as such should not expect to be granted name suppression based solely on 
their celebrity status. 
There is a defence to the tort of privacy that provides justification for the 
publication of private facts, where the information is of legitimate public 
concem.97 The word 'concern' was deliberately chosen, rather than the broader 
word 'curiosity' in acknowledgement of the fact that there is a difference 
between what is of public interest and what the public are interested in.98 This 
conception of public interest accords with how public interest should be 
interpreted m the context of name suppression. Whilst not helpful to the 
argument that there should be a "special echelon for privileged people", it 
implies that absent any genuine public interest reason there should be no 
publication of a person's name. 
While the tort of privacy does not provide justification for the creation of 
a "special echelon for privileged people" it suggests that there should be public 
interest reasons supporting the publication of a person's name where they wish to 
maintain privacy. The paper now goes on to consider possible options for 
reforming suppression law. 
95 Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I, para 121 (CA) Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
96 Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I, para 121 (CA) Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
97 Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I, para 129 (CA) Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
98 Hosking v Runting [2005] I NZLR I, para 133 (CA) Gault and Blanchard JJ. 
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V REFORMING SUPPRESSION LAW 
There are numerous areas of suppression law that have been highlighted 
as problematic. This section of the paper seeks to examine some possible options 
for reform in the area of suppression law in order to determine whether some of 
the identified problems with the current approach to suppression law can be 
overcome. 
The state of the law as to when suppression orders should be granted is 
relatively clear and well settled despite the lack of legislative guidance. The 
principle of openness is fundamental and compelling reasons are needed to 
depart from the weighty presumption in favour of publication. The adherence to 
this approach has been less than consistent, as was evident in the comparison of 
the Victim X case and that of Mr W, which forms part of the criticism of 
suppression orders in general. The main concerns for the purpose of this paper 
are that the presumption against name suppression does not appear to be 
justifiable, and also that the same test and factors are applied in a suppression 
decision regardless of whom the suppression order is for. The paper now 
considers how these perceived problems could be addressed. 
A Victims of Offences 
1 law Commission recommendations 
The Law Commission has recommended several changes to the operation 
of suppression laws including that "[ w]here a request for name suppression of a 
victim in criminal proceedings is made, that request should be granted unless it 
would not be in the interests of justice to do so."
99 The government however 
considers that the existing laws regarding suppression are appropriate.
10° Further, 
the response of the government emphasises that the current laws are premised on 
the fundamental importance of the principle of openness and that exceptions 
99 New Zealand Law Commission Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts 
and Tribunals (NZLC R 85, Wellington, March 2004). 
100 New Zealand Law Commission Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts 
and Tribunals (NZLC R 85, Wellington, March 2004). 
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already exist where appropriate. 101 It has already been shown that the principle of 
openness does not adequately justify the current approach to name suppression. 
As such the response of the government can be criticised, and should be 
reconsidered. 
The Victim X case highlighted the unfairness in having the same 
considerations used in applications for suppression orders that emanate from the 
victim of the offence, as would apply if the applicant was an accused or 
convicted person. The recommendation of the Law Commission would alleviate 
this unfairness by allowing that where an application is made for name 
suppression by a victim it would in general be granted. It is unclear what 
situations would fit under the exception "unless it would not be in the interests of 
justice to do so", which detracts from the persuasiveness of the recommendation. 
That there should be a mechanism, such as an exclusion, to enable the judge to 
disallow an application is necessary as there may be a situation where it is 
desirable that the victim is not allowed name suppression. But whether the Law 
Commission's mechanism is the correct one is debatable. Their exclusion does fit 
in with the notion that "[t]he general rule of publicity is after all only the means 
to an end and must yield to the paramount object of doing justice."102 So, where 
publication would serve some end of justice, the Court would have a mechanism 
by which it could deny the application for a suppression order. 
Although undoubtedly there are many situations where it would not be in 
the interests of justice to grant a victim name suppression, the Law Commission 
exception still has the appearance of being ambiguous. Although "interests of 
justice" need not be defined, it would have been beneficial if the Law 
Commission had given some direction on when this exception should apply. The 
Law Commission's particular wording seems to have been chosen to maintain 
consistency with section 138 of the Act, which provides that a Judge may make a 
suppression order, relating to evidence adduced or names of persons, if it would 
101 
New Zealand Law Commission Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts 
and Tribunals (NZLC R 85, Wellington, March 2004). 
102 
Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney-General [ 1982] 1 NZLR 120, 131 (CA) 
Woodhouse P for the Court. 
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be in the interests of justice. 103 The situations that are intended to be covered by 
section 138 of the Act are where an order may be necessary for the protection of 
the witness or where there is concern that the crime may be copied (for example 
in fraud proceedings). 104 The interests of justice could mean justice in the general 
wider sense, and also could in fact be referring to justice as between the 
parties. 105 In this regard, the "interests of justice" exception makes sense. Also 
the Law Commission recommendation remedies the situation, as in Re Victim X, 
where there are no public interest factors supporting the publication of the 
victim's name. Under the Law Commission recommendation there would be no 
publication in a situation such as that. 
The Law Commission recommendation is meritorious in that it seeks to 
provide greater protection and respect to victims of offences. The 
recommendation recogmses the unfairness inherent in having the same 
considerations apply to an application for a suppression order, regardless of 
whether the applicant is a victim or an offender. The recommendation also 
recognises that there is no justification for treating victims in the same manner as 
offenders are treated, 106 particularly after the promulgation of the Victims' 
Rights Act 2002, an Act "to improve provisions for the treatment and rights of 
victims of offences". 107 The Victim X case highlighted the unfairness in having 
the same considerations applying, and this paper considers that the Law 
Commission recommendation could be an appropriate mechanism for remedying 
this unfairness. However, it is argued that the Law Commission recommendation 
is unnecessary, as alternatively this paper proposes the insertion of a new section 
140A into the Act. Section 140A is seen as preferable to the Law Commission 
recommendation as it also remedies other unfairness that is inherent in the 
current approach to suppression law. The paper now considers other aspects of 
103 Criminal Justice Act l 985, s l 38(2)(a)(i)-(ii). 
104 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice" (200 l) 21 VUWLR l 77, 197. 
105 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice" (2001) 21 VU WLR l 77, 197 when discussing "the interests of justice" in section 138 of 
the Act. 
106 New Zealand Law Commission Delivering Justice for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts 
and Tribunals (NZLC R 85, Wellington, March 2004). 
107 Victims' Rights Act 2002, s 3. 
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the current approach that promote unfairness, and then subsequently proposes an 
alternative to the current approach to suppression law. 
B Offenders 
This paper has considered the fundamental principle of openness and 
explored possible justifications for the presumption in favour of publication. 
Publication of an offender's name has been shown to be unnecessary to preserve 
the fundamental importance of openness, as the Court will still be open to the 
media and usually to the public, and in general knowing the offender's name 
does not add anything to the report. It is in this regard that the paper proposes 
that the approach to name suppression applications is in need of reconsideration, 
as the presumptions that the current approach are premised upon do not seem to 
be entirely justifiable. 
It is submitted that in general names of those involved in criminal 
proceedings should be publishable, but where an application is made for name 
suppression a presumption in favour of publication is inappropriate. "[P]ublicity 
is after all only the means to an end and must yield to the paramount object of 
doing justice. " 108 What is important is that the interests of justice are served. The 
interests of justice do not appear to be served by having an inflexible requirement 
that "compelling reasons" must be evidenced in order to justify name 
suppression. Unless there are public interest reasons justifying the denial of a 
name suppression application, then applications should generally be accepted 
without the need for "compelling reasons". 
The inherent unfairness m treating victims m the same manner has 
already been highlighted. It is further submitted that there is unfairness in 
treating convicted, accused and acquitted persons in the same way. 
Fundamentally different considerations apply depending on what stage of the 
criminal proceedings a defendant is at. The presumption of innocence or a 
person's acquittal are factors that deserve to be accorded more weight when a 
108 Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand v Attorney-General [1982) l NZLR 120, 131 (CA) 
Woodhouse P for the Court. 
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decision is made concerning name suppression than the current approach dictates. 
The next section seeks to provide justification for treating these classes of 
persons differently. 
I Accused Persons 
"While the rhetoric of the court system is that an accused is presumed 
innocent until proven guilty, the punishment of publicity can be meted out before 
a verdict is reached, often with long lasting effects." 109 Under the current 
approach to suppression law the presumption of innocence is only a factor to be 
considered and in itself does not justify the granting of name suppression. Hence, 
in essence the same considerations apply to an accused person as they do to a 
convicted person. The presumption of innocence is a fundamental right 
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights Act, 110 and the publication of a person's name at 
the pre-trial stage is arguably a serious encroachment on this right. It was 
recognised earlier that publicity serves a punitive function. Although an accused 
person is presumed by the Court to be innocent until proven guilty, the public 
does not always afford an accused the benefit of this presumption. Because 
people generally think that "there is no smoke without fire", 111 publication of an 
accusation serves the same punitive function as the publication of a conviction. 
In that regard it is not in accordance with the principles of justice that there needs 
to be "compelling reasons" before an accused can obtain the full benefit of their 
right to be presumed innocent. Rather there should be a requirement of 
"compelling reasons", such as genuine public interest reasons, in order to 
disallow an accused person ' s application for name suppression because of the 
importance of the presumption of innocence. 
2 Acquitted Persons 
The Court of Appeal in Liddell also held that the same considerations 
apply to an acquitted person applying for name suppression as a convicted person, 
109 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice" (200 l) 2 l VUWLR 177, 203 footnote omitted. 
110 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 25(c). 
111 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice" (200 I) 21 VUWLR I 77, 203. 
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that "compelling reasons" are needed to displace the weighty presumption in 
favour of openness, and that the "public may have an interest in acquittals". 112 
Although name suppression will be more readily granted to a person who is 
acquitted, 113 and interim name suppression may be granted to an accused person, 
it seems unjust that acquitted and accused persons are treated in the same way as 
a convicted person. "Acquittals are often not as widely [publicised], and some 
people may think that the person was guilty, but somehow managed to get off on 
a 'technicality"'. 114 An accused person may receive a considerable amount of 
publicity for their alleged criminal involvement, but it does not necessarily 
follow that their subsequent acquittal will be prominently publicised. Even if 
their acquittal is publicised the punitive aspect of punishment can still operate, as 
it is often believed that "there is no smoke without fire". 115 Thus, where an 
acquitted person applies for name suppression it is argued that it should generally 
be granted unless there are public interest reasons justifying the publication, 
because of the punitive effect that publication can have. 
C The Need for Public Interest 
The above section highlighted the unfairness in the current approach to 
suppression law, that persons are treated in the same manner regardless of 
whether they are a victim or offender, and regardless of what stage they are at in 
the criminal process. 
However, it is argued by this paper that in order to alleviate this 
unfairness all that is required is an approach that is based upon public interest. 
Beyond failing to make a distinction between the classes of persons, the current 
approach is concerning, what is more concerning about the current approach is 
that public interest is not a focal point. The concomitant publicity that 
accompanies publication of a person's name is often punitive, and it encroaches 
on the privacy interests of the person named. The main concern in publishing a 
11 2 R v Liddell [1995] I NZLR 538, 547 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
113 R v Liddell [1995] I NZLR 538,547 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
114 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice"(2001)21 VUWLR 177,203. 
11 5 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice" (200 I) 21 VUWLR I 77, 203 . 
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person's name 1s that these interests are violated without justification. The 
problem that has been commonly identified throughout this paper is that 
publication can occur whether it is a victim, an accused, an acquitted or a 
convicted person where there is no justification for publication. Despite the 
concerns that this paper has identified with the current operation of suppression 
law, it has always accepted that public interest provides an adequate basis for the 
making of a suppression order, even where it encroaches on an innocent person's 
private interests. Hence it is accepted that as long as publication of a person's 
name can be justified on the grounds of public interest then these concerns, 
regarding justifiability and the failure to distinguish between classes of persons, 
have been adequately allayed. In this regard then the paper proposes that 
decisions that are made concerning name suppression should be based primarily 
on public interest. 
D Reform 
If the above arguments are accepted, that there should be a requirement of 
public interest in order to justify declining an application for name suppression, 
then where should the change emanate from: Court or Parliament? 
As section 140 of the Act is generally permissive, it would be within the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court to dictate that a new 
approach to suppression orders is required, and that absent any public interest 
factors it should be unnecessary to require that "compelling reasons" are given in 
order to justify a suppression order. However, it would be preferable and more 
certain if the change were to come from Parliament. Although the 
recommendations by the Law Commission are meritorious they are seen as 
superfluous, as it is argued by this paper that the injustices that the Law 
Commission seeks to remedy can be resolved via the refonn proposed below. 
For practical reasons it is necessary and preferable that applications for 
suppression orders are required rather than name suppression being automatic. 
This is because if name suppression was automatic there may be circumstances 
where it would be in the public interest to know a person's identity and a blanket 
rule making name suppression automatic may prevent the public from knowing 
this person's identity. 116 Although previously, when name suppression was 
automatic for accused persons in New Zealand, 117 the Judge could make an order 
that allowed publication, it is unclear whether this alone satisfactorily allays the 
concern as there is still the possibility that the public interest can be jeopardised. 
The criteria for allowing name suppression should be different from the current 
presumption in favour of publication. This paper proposes that the law regarding 
suppression orders should be amended and a new section 140A should be 
inserted into the Act as follows: 
Section 140A - Where an application is made under section 140 of 
this Act the application should be allowed unless it would not be in 
the public interest to do so. In considering an application under 
section 140 the Court must take into consideration whether the 
applicant is a victim, an accused or otherwise, and give weight to this 
accordingly. 
Public interest, under section 140A, would not be wide enough to include 
public prurience, but rather would include factors analogous to those already 
considered, such as those discussed in R v Liddelf. 118 Although 'public interest' 
as a concept would not be defined by the legislation, it is recommended that there 
is some direction as to what constitutes public interest, but without providing an 
exhaustive list. This would ensure that the section is not interpreted in a way that 
incorporates public curiosity or prurience as these are not valid public interest 
factors. No justification has been found for the current approach to suppression 
law that requires "compelling reasons" to depart from the presumption in favour 
of reporting. Section 140A requires that where an application for name 
suppression is not granted, that such a decision must be justified in the public 
interest and this ensures that the publication serves some end of justice. In order 
to show that it is not in the public interest to grant name suppression the party 
116 Claire Baylis "Justice Done And Justice Seen To Be Done - The Public Administration Of 
Justice" (2001) 21 VUWLR 177,205. 
117 
From 1975-1976 the Criminal Justice Act l 954 was reformed so that publication of an 
accused person's name was prohibited by sections 45B-D until they were convicted, and if they 
were acquitted then the suppression became permanent. See Claire Baylis "Justice Done And 
Justice Seen To Be Done- The Public Administration Of Justice" (200 l) 2 l VUWLR 177, 202. 
118 R v Liddell [ 1995] 1 NZLR 538, 544-546 (CA) Cooke P for the Court. 
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opposing name suppression would have an evidential burden to point to some 
credible narrative suggesting that it is not in the public interest to grant name 
suppression. Where is no evidence or insufficient evidence to suggest that 
publication of the applicant's name would be in the public interest then the 
application for name suppression would be granted. Any decision made under 
sections 140 and 140A should be appealable by either party and shall also be 
reviewable at any later stage by the Court. This would ensure that the Court has 
the ability to take into account changes in circumstances. 
Although in general any concerns about name suppress10n should be 
alleviated by having a public interest requirement before an application is denied, 
concerns can be further allayed by making it mandatory for the Court to consider 
the role that the applicant plays in the criminal process. By mandating this 
approach it is envisaged that more weight will be given to the fact that the 
applicant is for example a victim, and accordingly greater public interest will be 
required to deny their application for name suppression. This approach also 
reinforces that different considerations apply depending on what role the 
applicant plays in the process, and also depending on what stage of the 
proceedings it is. 
To ensure accountability and openness it is recommended that all decisions 
on name suppression applications are accompanied by reasons supporting the 
decision. This ensures that decisions cannot be criticised in the same way that the 
decision of Judge Everitt was in the "white-collar drug-ring" case. 
The section 140A reform would ensure that where name suppress10n 
applications are denied and a person's name is publishable, the decision is based 
on defensible principles and presumptions. The public interest would be served, 
the fundamental importance of the principle of openness is still upheld and 
justice would be done. 
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VI CONCLUSION 
Despite the lack of clear legislative guidance, the approach to suppression 
law in New Zealand is surprisingly clear, although not consistent. There is a 
strong presumption in favour of publication, and this is only departed from where 
there are "compelling reasons" to justify doing so. This approach is apparently 
justified by the fundamental principle of openness and that justice has to be seen 
to be done. 
The cases of the All Black, Victim X and the "white-collar drug-ring" 
were discussed as they each raise interesting issues in the context of name 
suppression. It was argued that the All Black case was wrongly decided, but for 
the right reasons and conversely the Victim X case was rightly decided, but for 
the wrong reasons. These cases highlighted some of the problematic elements of 
the current approach to suppression law. 
The validity of the principle of openness as a justification for the 
presumption against name suppression was explored in order to determine 
whether the current approach to suppression law is justifiable. Open justice and 
the principle of openness were found to be insufficient as justifications for this 
approach to suppression law as name suppression does not encroach on the 
openness of justice. The courts are still open to the public and the media, and 
details of the case are still publishable. Further, it was argued that in most cases 
knowing the identity of the person would not add anything to a story about the 
case, apart from fuelling public prurience. Disallowing an application for name 
suppression because there are no "compelling reasons" to do so does not serve 
any end of justice. The only valid basis for publication of a person's name 
despite an application for name suppression is public interest, as serving the 
public interest is serving an end of justice. It is important to note however that 
public interest is not the same thing as public prurience or curiosity. 
The unfairness inherent in the current approach to suppression law was 
also found to be unjustifiable. There are no reasons that necessitate treating 
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victims, offenders, witnesses, accused persons or acquitted persons in the same 
manner when it comes to making a decision about granting or denying name 
suppression. The paper also considered whether it could be justifiable to create a 
"special echelon for privileged people" in tenns of making a suppression order 
on the basis of a person's societal status. Despite the increasing recognition of 
the privacy interests of public persons, such an approach to suppression law was 
not found to be justifiable. This examination did however, highlight that 
publication of a person's name despite their claim to privacy should only occur 
where it is in the public interest. 
As the current approach to suppression law was highlighted as 
unjustifiable, and at times unfair, the paper considered possible options for 
reform. The Law Commission's recommendation was discussed, and was found 
to provide an appropriate mechanism for remedying the unfairness of the current 
approach to suppression law with regard to victims of offences. However, their 
recommendation was seen to be superfluous, as the insertion of a new section 
140A would remedy the unfairness to victims, as well as the unfairness to all 
other applicants. 
The section 140A focus on public interest remedies the inadequacies of 
the current approach to suppression law, and it would ensure that decisions on 
name suppression applications were justified in the public interest. Section 140A 
also mandates that the Court takes into consideration the role that the applicant 
plays in the proceedings, in order to ensure that appropriate weight is given to 
factors such as the presumption of innocence. It was argued that the insertion of 
section 140A is preferable to the current approach to suppression law as it 
ensures that decisions regarding name suppression are justifiable. Open justice 
can still be of fundamental importance under section 140A, but most importantly 
it would ensure that the public interest is served. 
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VIII APPENDIX 
Criminal Justice Act 1985 
Section 140.Court may prohibit publication of names-
( l )Except as otherwise expressly provided in any enactment, a court may make 
an order prohibiting the publication, in any report or account relating to any 
proceedings in respect of an offence, of the name, address, or occupation of the 
person accused or convicted of the offence, or of any other person connected 
with the proceedings, or any particulars likely to lead to any such person's 
identification. 
(2)Any such order may be made to have effect only for a limited period, whether 
fixed in the order or to terminate in accordance with the order; or if it is not so 
made, it shall have effect permanently. 
(3)If any such order is expressed to have effect until the detennination of an 
intended appeal, and no notice of appeal or of application for leave to appeal is 
filed or given within the time limited or allowed by or under the relevant 
enactment, the order shall cease to have effect on the expiry of that time; but if 
such a notice is given within that time, the order shall cease to have effect on the 
determination of the appeal or on the occurrence or non-occurrence of any event 
as a result of which the proceedings or prospective proceedings are brought to an 
end. 
( 4)The making under this section of an order having effect only for a limited 
period shall not prevent any court from making under this section any further 
order having effect either for a limited period or pem1anently. 
[( 4A)When determining whether to make any such order or further order in 
respect of a person accused or convicted of an offence and having effect 
pennanently, a court must take into account any views of a victim of the offence, 
or of a parent or legal guardian of a victim of the offence, conveyed in 
accordance with section 28 of the Victims' Rights Act 2002.] 
(S)Every person commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to a 
fine not exceeding $1,000 who commits a breach of any order made under this 
section or evades or attempts to evade any such order. 
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